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Abstract
Grouping in animals is ubiquitous. However grouping is thought to provide individuals
with foraging and antipredatory advantages, parasitic strategy often emerges in a group.
If parasitic strategy cannot simultaneously search for food itself and parasitize other
foragers, the success of parasitic strategy within any group is likely to be dependent on
its frequency. The optimal parasitic policy has given rise to the producer-scrounger (PS)
game model, in which producers search for food patches, and scroungers parasitize the
discovered patches. The N-persons PS game model constructed by Vickery et al.
(Vickery, W. L., Gireldeau, L., Templeton, J. J., Kramer, D. L., and Chapman, C. A.,
1991. Producers, scroungers, and group foraging. American Naturalist 137, pp. 847-863)
predicts the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of frequency of producers (q^) that
depends on the advantage of producers and the number of foragers in a group. However,
the model assumes that the number of discovered patches in one time unit never exceeds
one. In reality, multiple patches could be found in one time unit. In the present study,
we relax this assumption and assumed that the number of discovered patches depends
on the producers' variable encounter rate with patches (¸). We show that q^ strongly
depends on ¸ within a feasible range, although it still depends on the advantage of
producer and the number of foragers in a group. The basic idea of PS game is the same
as the information sharing (parasitism), because scroungers is also thought to parasitize
informations of locates of food patches. Horn referred the role of information parasitism
in animal aggregation as early as 1968 (Horn, H. S. 1968. The adaptive signi¯cance of
colonial nesting in the brewer's blackbird (euphagus cyanocephalus). Ecology 49, pp.
682-646). Our modi¯ed PS game model shows the same prediction as the Horn's
graphical animal aggregation model. Hence, if we consider food patch distribution and
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multiple patches could be found in one time, the PS game model is able to explain
animal aggregation. In this study, therefore, we compare our ¸-dependent PS game
model not only to Vickery's original PS game model but also to Horn's graphical animal
aggregation model.
Keywords : information-parasitism, group foraging, animal aggregation,
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Horn's model
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Introduction
Group foraging is widely assumed to be advantageous for animals. Two of its major
bene¯ts are lower predation hazard and increased foraging e±ciency (Clark and Mangel
1986) (e.g., increased foraging rate (Clark and Mangel 1984; Vickery et al. 1991),
reduced risk of starvation (Caraco 1981), and increased ability to capture elusive prey
(Ward and Enders 1985)). For example, Horn (1968) proposed a graphical model of the
spatial distribution of Brewer's blackbird (Euphagus cyanocephalus) nests in light of
foraging e±ciency. The model assumes territorial and colonial nesting, and in order to
minimize the average distance from nest to food, territorial nesting would be expected
when the distribution pattern of the food is uniform. When the distribution pattern of
the food is temporally and spatially clumped, colonial nesting would be favored. For
colonial nesting, Horn (1968) suggested that there is an additional advantage:
information sharing (information-parasitism) between individuals in the same colony,
which makes it possible for a bird who is foraging with little success to follow a more
successful bird to a better foraging area. The same argument was made in Clark and
Mangel (1984). They conclude that when food is abundant, information as to location is
not very valuable; if food is scarce but evenly distributed, little information is derived
from searching. Hence, °ocking is most valuable when food is both scarce and patchy
(Clark and Mangel 1984). These social foraging interactions among individuals are
common in group foraging of birds, and most common is the exploitation of others'
e®orts to ¯nd food (Brockmann and Barnard 1979).
Parasitism is important for group foraging because it produces both advantageous
(e.g. lower predation hazard and increased foraging e±ciency for parasitic strategy
(Clark and Mangel 1986)) and disadvantageous e®ects (e.g. decreasing of food gains for
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patch discoverer and/or depletion of food; tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968; Rankin
et al. 2007)). In other words, if foragers have the option of using a parasitic strategy,
they can choose group foraging with parasitism or solitary foraging without parasitism
depending on the situation. The optimal parasitic policy has been analyzed by two
theoretical models: the information-sharing (IS) model (Caraco 1981; Clark and
Mangel 1984) and the producer-scrounger (PS) game model (Barnard and Sibly 1981;
Vickery et al. 1991; Caraco and Giraldeau 1991; Giraldeau and Caraco 2000).
Traditionally, the IS model assumes that in a group of N foragers all individuals
search for food independently while, at the same time, monitoring the behavior of other
group members, thereby allowing unsuccessful foragers to exploit food clumps discovered
by others (Caraco 1981; Clark and Mangel 1984; Beauchamp and Giraldeau 1996). In
the IS models, therefore, if an individual can use parasitism, they always choose
parasitic behavior.
The PS game model (Barnard and Sibly 1981) is an N -person alternative-option
game in which individuals use the producer strategy to ¯nd food clumps and the
scrounger strategy to partake in food clumps discovered by the producers. For the PS
game to apply to a group foraging situation, two assumptions must be met. First,
individuals can play either producer or scrounger, but cannot simultaneously play both
producer and scrounger strategy. Second, the payo®s received by a scrounger must be
highly negatively-frequency-dependent on the frequency of scroungers in the group
(Barnard and Sibly 1981; Vickery et al. 1991; Caraco and Giraldeau 1991; Beauchamp
and Giraldeau 1996; Giraldeau and Beauchamp 1999; Giraldeau and Caraco 2000). In
the PS game model, even if individuals can use scrounging, they do not always choose
scrounging behavior. When those two assumptions are met, the PS game model predicts
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the mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of producers and scroungers.
An analytical PS game model constructed by Vickery et al. (1991) predicts the
ESS frequency of producers as a functions of the fraction of a producer's advantage to
the total food items in a patch and the number of foragers in a group. However the
model assumes the producer's encounter rate with food patches, the maximum number
of discovered patches in one time unit is always one, and the ESS frequency of producers
does not depend on the producer's encounter rate with food patches. In their model, it
is assumed that the producer's encounter rate with food patches is nearly equal to zero;
therefore, the number of discovered patches in one time unit never exceeds one. In
reality, the producer's encounter rate with food patches depends on the environment of
the foraging site, and multiple patches could be discovered in one time unit. In this
study, therefore, we modify this assumption to the variable encounter rate, and
investigate the occurrence of parasitism. If the producer's encounter rate with food
patches increases, the number of patches discovered during one time unit is sure to
multiply, and foragers might cease parasitism at a high encounter rate because the
bene¯ts of group foraging are reduced in such situations. Actually, some empirical
studies manipulated the producer's encounter rate with food patches by altering the
spatial distribution of food patches, and showed that this changes the proportional use
of producers and scroungers (Giraldeau et al. 1990; Giraldeau and Livoreil 1998;
Coolen et al. 2001; Coolen 2002).
We compare our modi¯ed PS game model to Vickery's original model (Vickery
et al. 1991). In addition to this, we discuss the relationship between our modi¯ed PS
game model and Horn's graphical model (Horn 1968), because Horn's model includes
the original PS game model situation as an extreme colonial strategy. A colony is a one
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of the animal aggregations, and some studies explained the evolutionary advantages of
colonial breeding by information sharing (Ward and Zahavi 1973), and Barta and
Giraldeau (2001) reappraise this hypotheses using the PS game model.
The PS game model
In Vickery's PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991), N individuals forage in su±cient
proximity that group members playing scrounger can all detect and exploit the food
uncovered by any of the group's producers. A food clump contains F items. The
producer obtains a ¯nder's advantage, a portion (a) of the patch (0 · a < F ) that it can
use exclusively before the scroungers arrive. The proportion of individuals playing
producer is q, and the proportion playing scrounger is 1¡ q. The producer's encounter
rate with food patches is ¸. Once a producer ¯nds a clump, (1¡ q)N scroungers arrive in
unison and divide the remaining food items (A = F ¡ a) equally among the individuals
(n = 1 + (1¡ q)N). The currency of ¯tness is energy intake, I. Patch discovery occurs
sequentially, and patch exploitation time is negligible, which means that there is no
handling time. Each producer's expected intake (IP ) after T time units of foraging is
IP = ¸T (a+
A
n
): (1)
The rate of encounter with scrounging opportunities is a function only of the number of
producers (qN). The scrounger's expected intake (IS) is
IS = ¸TqN
A
n
: (2)
The ESS frequency of producers (q^) can be found by setting IP equal to IS and solving
for q:
q^ =
a
F
+
1
N
(3)
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The ESS frequency of producers (q^) depends on the fraction of a ¯nder's advantage (a)
to the total food items in a patch (F ) and the foraging group size (N).
The ¸-dependent PS game model
Vickery et al. (1991) supposed that patches are scarce so that the maximum number of
discovered patches in one time unit is only one, and all scroungers in a foraging group
rush to the discovered patch and exploit food items. This assumption is considered
reasonable if the number of producers in a foraging group (qN) is a minority and if a
producer's encounter rate with food patches (¸) is small enough. However, if qN is large
and/or ¸ is not small, the number of discovered patches in one time unit might exceed
one, and a number of those discovered patches might disperse scroungers in multiple
exploiting groups. In such a scenario, the number of discovered patches in one time unit
depends on qN and ¸. We modi¯ed the PS game model, which assumes that the
number of discovered patches in one time unit depends on the number of producers in
the foraging group (qN) and the producer's encounter rate with food patches (¸). We
call this modi¯ed PS game the ¸-dependent PS game model.
All parameters in the ¸-dependent PS game model are the same as in the original
PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991). We assume that the number of discovered patches
in one time unit is determined by binomial distribution, and scroungers are divided
equally between all food patches discovered in one time unit. Assuming that when one
producer ¯nds a food patch, other i (0 · i · qN ¡ 1) producers ¯nd food patches
during the same time unit, the producer's expected intake (IP ) after T time units is
IP = ¸T
qN¡1X
i=0
0BBB@ qN ¡ 1
i
1CCCA¸i(1¡ ¸)qN¡1¡i
0@a+ F ¡ a
1 + (1¡q)N
1+i
1A : (4)
8
When j (1 · j · qN) producers ¯nd food patches during one time unit, the scrounger's
expected intake (IS) after T time units is
IS = T
qNX
j=1
0BBB@ qN
j
1CCCA¸j(1¡ ¸)qN¡j
0@ F ¡ a
1 + (1¡q)N
j
1A : (5)
Because i = j ¡ 1, IP can be written by j as
IP = T
qNX
j=1
0BBB@ qN ¡ 1
j ¡ 1
1CCCA¸j(1¡ ¸)qN¡j
0@ F ¡ a
1 + (1¡q)N
j
1A+ T qNX
j=1
0BBB@ qN ¡ 1
j ¡ 1
1CCCA¸j(1¡ ¸)qN¡ja:
(6)
As the ¯rst term in this expression is IS £ j=qN (j · qN), there is a possibility that a
producer's expected intake equals a scrounger's expected intake (IP = IS). The ESS
frequency of producer (q^) is solved by equaling eq. 5 with eq. 6, which can be simpli¯ed
as follows:
qNX
j=1
0BBB@ qN ¡ 1
j ¡ 1
1CCCA¸j(1¡ ¸)qN¡j
Ã
F (j ¡ qN) + aN
j + (1¡ q)N
!
= 0 (7)
This equation cannot be solved analytically, so we solve it numerically to ¯nd the ESS
frequency of producers (q^).
In the numerical analysis, ¯xed values are the number of members in a foraging
group (N), the number of food items in a patch (F ), and the producers' encounter rate
with food patches (¸). Variable values are the ¯nder's advantage (a) and the proportion
of producers (q). For example, we ¯x N = 2, F = 10, and ¸ = 0:1. Then, we change a
from 0 to F and q from 1=N to 1, and ¯nd the combination of a and q^, which satis¯es
IP = IS (eq. 7). In this example, there are two combinations of a and q^: a = 0
(a=F = 0), q^ = 0:5 (1=2) and a = 5 (a=F = 0:5), q^ = 1 (2=2).
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Figure 1 shows the ESS frequency of producers (q^) represented by stepwise lines in
a=F -q dimension with the number of foragers in a group (N) as 10. The stepwise solid
line describes the original PS game model (q^ = a=F + 1=N). The stepwise dotted lines
describe the ¸-dependent PS game model, for which the producers' encounter rate with
food patches (¸) is ¯xed at 0:01, 0:1, 0:3, 0:5, 0:7, and 0:9. q^ increased as ¸ increased,
and ¸ of the original PS game model is nearly equal to zero (¸ ' 0). Therefore, even
though ¸ = 0:01, the q^ of the ¸-dependent model is sometimes higher than that of the
original PS game model (Fig. 1).
Figure 2 shows the borderlines between group foraging with parasitism (coexistence
of producers and scroungers) and solitary foraging without parasitism (producers only)
in ¸¡ a=F dimension. When ¸ is small, the coexistence of producers and scroungers has
a wide range for a=F , and this range is wider with a larger N . However, it becomes
narrower as ¸ increases and the di®erence between N diminishes at a large ¸.
Figure 3 shows the four examples of the number of foragers in a group (N) (2, 4, 8,
and 16) of the original PS game model, and one combined (superimposed) graph of
these four examples. In the original PS game model, the slope of the ESS frequency of
producers (q^) is unity in a=F -q dimension (q^ = a=F + 1=N), so that the q^ of a larger N
never exceeds that of a smaller N (superimposed graph). In the ¸-dependent PS game
model, however, the q^ of a larger N sometimes exceeds that of a smaller N (Fig. 4;
¸ = 0:3).
Discussion
We modi¯ed the PS game model proposed by Vickery et al. (1991) to the ¸-dependent
PS game model, which assumes that the number of discovered patches in one time unit
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depends on the producer's encounter rate with patches (¸). The ESS frequency of
producers (q^) depends on three parameters for the ¸-dependent PS game model (¸, a=F ,
and N), and we will discuss these parameters' e®ects on the polymorphic q^ (coexistence
of producers and scroungers) comparing with Vickery's original PS game model. First,
we will discuss the length of one time unit in the PS game model because ¸ relates to it.
Second, we will discuss the e®ect of the variable ¸ on q^, and the relationship between
the ¸-dependent PS game model and Horn's graphical nesting model (Horn 1968).
Third, we will discuss the e®ect of ¯nder's advantage (a=F ) on q^. And ¯nally, we will
discuss the e®ect of the number of foragers in a group (N) on q^.
The length of one time unit in the PS game model
¸ describes a producer's encounter rate with food patches, so that if a producer searches
for food patches for T time units, the number of patches discovered by each producer is
¸T . When we set ¸ = 0:01, it means that a producer ¯nds one food patch in 100 time
units. Then, how long is one time unit in the PS game model? In the original PS game
model (Vickery et al. 1991), patch exploitation time is assumed to be negligible because
patches are scarce in foraging areas, so search time is long relative to exploitation time.
Ignoring exploitation time means that one time unit includes the events following
foraging: a producer ¯nds a food patch and consumes the ¯nder's advantage (a) before
scroungers arrive, and the producer and scroungers (1 + (1¡ q)N) consume the
remaining food items (F ¡ a). In the PS game model, all these events occur in one time
unit, and this is the length of one time unit implied in the PS game model. In the
original PS game model, ¸ is set to make food ¯nding an extremely rare event. If food
¯nding events are not rare, how a situation of PS game will change? We discuss this
e®ect connecting with animal aggregation in the following section. .
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The e®ect of a variable ¸ on q^ and the relationship between the
¸-dependent PS game model and Horn's model
In the ¸-dependent PS game model, the ESS frequency of producers (q^) at a given
producer's advantage (a=F ) increases as ¸ increases (Fig. 1). q^ of ¸-dependent PS game
model is the same or larger than that of original PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991)
in all range of ¸ > 0. If ¸ increases, the number of discovered patches in one time unit
increases and scroungers are equally divided between each patch so that producers and
scroungers gain an equal amount of food even if a=F is not large. In addition to this,
the ratio of coexistence of producers and scroungers become smaller in the a=F
dimension and all foragers end up producers as ¸ increases, meaning that foragers cease
group foraging with parasitism (Fig. 2). The PS game condition is assumed to occur
when not every forager is equally successful at foraging, so that some foragers parasitize
other foragers' information of food. Therefore, if ¸ is large enough and each forager is
successful, they do not need to parasitize for information and the PS game (parasitism)
situation would dissolve. Some empirical studies showed the same trend with this
prediction when the spatial distribution of food patches are distributed more
(Giraldeau et al. 1990; Giraldeau and Livoreil 1998; Coolen et al. 2001; Coolen 2002).
When the food distribution is considered and multiple patches can be found in one
time unit, the PS game model is able to connect with a subject of animal aggregation;
group foraging (grouping) or solitary foraging (solitariness). This is the same situation
in Horn's graphical model of whether colonial or territorial nesting is favored (Horn
1968). When ¸ is large, it is the same as when the distribution pattern of food is
uniform, and territorial nesting (solitary foraging) would be expected. On the other
hand, when ¸ is small, it is the same as when the distribution pattern of food is
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temporally and spatially clumped, and colonial nesting (group foraging) would be
favored. Hence, the ¸-dependent PS game model shows the same predict of Horn's
graphical nesting model (Horn 1968). Barta and Giraldeau (2001) also use the PS
game to reappraise information-based hypotheses that explains the evolutionary
advantages of colonial breeding.
The e®ect of a=F on q^
As well as the original PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991), a=F plays an important
role in the coexistence of producers and scroungers, but the e®ect of a=F on q^ in the
¸-dependent PS game model is smaller than that of the original PS game model. When
¸ is less than 0:5, producers and scroungers are able to coexist unless a=F is less than
0:5 and the number of foragers (N) is less than 4 (Fig. 2). When ¸ increases, however,
even though a=F (advantage of producers) is small enough, the strategy of producer is
favored and the PS game (group foraging with parasitism) condition could not occur at
any N . In the original PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991), on the contrary, producers
and scroungers are always able to coexist at any N if a=F is less than 0:5.
The positive e®ect of N on q^ in the ¸-dependent PS game model
In the original PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991), q^ at a given a=F decreases as N
increases. This is obvious from the q^ equation: q^ = a=F + 1=N . And, even if we ¯x q^N
as an integer, q^ of a larger N never exceeds that of a smaller N (Fig. 3). Because the
maximum number of discovered food patches in one time unit is only one, the number of
scroungers gather in the patch ((1¡ q)N) increases as N increases, so that the
increasing of N causes a only negative e®ect on producers. Conversely, in the
¸-dependent PS game model, the number of discovered food patches in one time unit
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increases as ¸ and N increase, and scroungers are equally divided between those food
patches, so that the di®erence of q^ between various N at a given a=F becomes smaller
as ¸ increases. When we ¯x q^N as an integer, available q^ increases and the increment
decreases little by little as N increases, and q^ of the bigger N exceeds that of the smaller
N at some given a=F (Fig. 4). This positive e®ect of N on q^ is never seen in the
original PS game model (Vickery et al. 1991). In the ¸-dependent PS game model, if
the food patches are abundant in the foraging area, the food intake per individual does
not decrease as N increases. Therefore, the aggregation of foraging individuals keeps up
and N becomes larger. As we mentioned above, however, the PS game condition often
occurs around small ¸, so this case might be rare.
Additional Considerations
As we described above, the e®ect of ¸ on q^ is not negligible in the PS game. Therefore,
when we apply the PS game model, we have to check the ¸ of the intended species and
foraging area. In this study, we assumed that each patch has a ¯nite renewable resource
for simplicity, so that a binomial distribution is used to calculate the predicted number
of discovered food patches in one time unit. In reality, however, patches are usually a
¯nite resource that do not instantaneously replenish. Hence, a hypergeometric
distribution might be more appropriate for the foraging situation of some species of
birds, which are often used for test of PS game model. In addition to this, other
probability distribution functions (negative binomial (hypergeometric) distribution,
uniform distribution, etc.) should be used according to the distribution of food
availability.
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Figure 1: The ESS frequency of producers of N = 10
The solid line is the original PS game model and the others lines are ¸ = 0:01, 0:1,
0:3, 0:5, 0:7, 0:9.
Figure 2: Borderline between group foraging and solitary foraging
The line describes the maximum fraction of producer's advantage (a=F ) at which
producers and scroungers can co-exist.
Figure 3: The ESS frequency of producers in the original PS game model
The left-hand side of ¯gure shows four examples of ESS frequency of producers (q^) in
N = 2, 4, 8, and 16. The right-hand side of ¯gure combines these four examples.
Figure 4: The ESS frequency of producers in the ¸-dependent PS game model with
¸ = 0:3
The left-hand side of ¯gure shows four examples of ESS frequency of producers (q^) in
N = 2, 4, 8, and 16. The right-hand side of ¯gure combines these four examples.
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